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Introduction
In August 2011, after decades of failed
attempts, the Hellenic Parliament enacted
substantial reforms to higher education in
Greece (Kyriazis and Asderaki). Both major par-
ties, the socialist PASOK and center-right New
Democracy, supported this extraordinary leg-
islation in spite of political instability caused 
by the debt crisis and the impending national
elections. According to Alexandra Mitsotaki,
founder of ActionAid Hellas, in her article in
Kathimerini, “[The political parties] resist
undertaking the overriding structural reforms
that Greece needs, preferring instead to pur-
sue profoundly unjust horizontal pension and
salary cuts.” Greece may implement austerity
measures in response to external pressures, but
it does not appear to have the political will
required for substantial reform. A rarely rec-
ognized fact, however, is that 260 of 300 mem-
bers of Parliament voted in favor of the August
2011 reforms, which represents an unprece-
dented mandate for education reform (Mavro-
gordatos, 2012).
The 2011 reforms address long-standing
issues in higher education and even remove the
asylum law, which banned police from univer-
sity campuses without the permission of univer-
sity rectors. Because these are the deepest
reforms implemented in Greece since the onset
of the financial crisis, their outcome will pro-
vide the first indications of the potential long-
term success of political and economic reform
in Greece and its impact on current economic
conditions. Results thus far are mixed.
The Greek higher education system was
founded on lofty ideals, and these aspirations are
founded in the nation’s constitution. Article 16
states, “Education constitutes a basic mission for
the State and shall aim at the moral, intellectual,
professional and physical training of Greeks, the
development of national and religious conscious-
ness and at their formation as free and responsi-
ble citizens.” To this end, the higher education is
structured as follows by the constitution:
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Higher education is provided solely
by institutions which are public entities
with full autonomy. These institutions
shall operate under the supervision of
the State and are entitled to financial assis-
tance from it; they shall operate on the
basis of statutorily enacted by-laws. [. . .]
Professors of university level institutions
shall be public functionaries. The remain-
ing teaching personnel likewise perform a
public function, under the conditions
specified by law.
Students and professors who protest current
reforms often cite these ideas encoded in the
constitution.
Despite its seemingly high-minded aspira-
tions, the Constitution has become an impedi-
ment to improvements in higher education in
Greece (Psacharopoulos, 2003). Today, the
Greek higher education system, instead of being
an ideal academy free from market pressures,
has become a classic monopoly with all of the
attendant consequences and lost welfare (Mit-
sopoulos and Pelagidis, 2006). In this paper, I
explore the consequences of the Greek state
monopoly of higher education set forth by the
constitution. Some of these consequences are
highly restricted admissions requirements for
students, low research output by faculty, and
high spending for low quality in education.
Despite historical problems in Greece, the
higher education reforms of August 2011 bring
reason for hope by addressing some of the dif-
ficult issues of Greek higher education. I explain
the theoretical and empirical conditions nec-
essary for the success of these reforms.
Historical Background and Structure
The original universities of modern
Greece, the National and Kapodistrian Univer-
sity of Athens and the National Technical Uni-
versity of Athens, were both founded in 1837.
From the beginning, university students were
active politically. In 1843, students and profes-
sors participated in protests that forced King
Otto to accept a Greek Constitution, and, in
1862, their clashes with police led to King Otto’s
abdication. Greece also had a relatively large
university enrollment in the 19th century. In
1885, it led a sample of six western European
countries with 10.9 university students per
10,000 inhabitants (Kyriazis and Asderaki). In
2009 it placed fifth in that same group (OECD).
Greece eventually lost its lead partly because
of the introduction of the numerus clausus sys-
tem established in 1954 to stem the growing
demand for education (Kyriazis and Asderaki;
Psacharopoulos). In the numerus clausus sys-
tem, universities negotiate the number of slots
available in each department with the education
ministry; students are then placed in universi-
ties based on exam scores and preferences
(European University Association). The Greek
higher education system and student numbers
continued to grow through the twentieth cen-
tury, though more slowly than in other Euro-
pean countries. Mostly, the system grew in the
countryside, increasing student access to edu-
cation in rural areas. In 1954 there were nine
universities in Greece, six of which were located
in Athens. Since then, Greece has added 14 uni-
versities with 32 campuses, including only
one in Athens.
In 1967, a right-wing military junta took
control of Greece in a coup d’état, an event that
proved disruptive to higher education. The
junta suspended freedom of thought and free-
dom of the press, and revoked the right of
assembly. On November 17, 1973 the military
was sent to quell a student protest. A tank
charged onto the campus of the Polytechnic
and killed 28 students in a crowd of protest-
ers, causing an uproar that accelerated the
downfall of the junta and ultimately led to
the introduction of the asylum law in 1982.
Under this law, Greek universities became
safe places for protestors and anarchists, allow-
ing them to assemble and plan protests.
Politics
Various groups benefit from the higher
education monopoly in Greece. These groups
include not only many students and tenured fac-
ulty, but also entrance exam tutors and cram
school teachers. Because university admission
is highly restricted in Greece, a cram school sys-
tem emerged to prepare students for the noto-
riously difficult entrance exams. Private spend-
ing on tutors and cram schools in Greece is as
large as public spending on secondary education
(Psacharopoulos and Papakonstantinou, 2005).
Not only do tutors and cram school teachers
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benefit from this monopoly, but university
professors also benefit from low expectations for
research and teaching (Mitsopoulos and
Pelagidis, 2006). While many students are
hurt by the higher education monopoly, those
who are admitted to universities can benefit
from the system. For example, inactive students
can remain in the universities without sitting
for exams and still enjoy privileges associated
with student status, such as discounted public
transportation fares (Psacharopoulos and
Papakonstantinou, 2005). Because over half of
Greek youth are unemployed, students have low
opportunity costs for remaining in school. Even
though degree programs last four years, forty
percent of undergraduates continue as students
beyond six years (Mavrogordatos). Before the
2011 reforms, there was no limit on the length
these “eternal students” could remain in the
universities or any requirement that students
make progress toward a degree. When free
tuition is threatened, students protect it by exer-
cising their substantial power on university
boards and through protests and university
shutdowns. This higher education monopoly
persists in a democracy because faculty and cer-
tain students, while a small portion of the
population, are willing to devote time and
resources to resisting reforms that threaten
their monopoly.
Entrance Examinations
The inefficiency of the Greek higher edu-
cation system starts with the entrance exami-
nations taken by students before they matric-
ulate (Psacharopoulos and Tassoulas, 2004). The
Panhellenic examinations require rote memo-
rization and, because universities have a twenty
percent acceptance rate, are very competitive.
More than four out of five university students
attend private cram schools (frontistiria in
Greek), fifty percent have private tutoring,
and one-third utilize both forms of preparation.
The cram schools and tutoring add approxi-
mately twenty hours to the regular school week.
Private spending on test preparation is 1.44
times larger than public spending on secondary
education (Psacharopoulos and Papakonstan-
tinou, 2005). Students observe that, though
their public education is required, their real
education comes through the cram schools. One
student says of her cram school education,
“We know that the only way to pass the exams
is to go to frontistiria. For us, school is fronti-
stiria and not the public school” (Athens News,
2010).
The Ministry of Education rations uni-
versity seats using numerus clausus, a system
that determines in advance the number of spots
for degrees within each university. Students
then fill these spots based on their scores on
entry examinations (Tsakloglou and Cholezas,
2005). This system, however, gives little regard
to demand. Psacharopoulos and Tassoulas
(2004) label the admission system as the Pro-
crustean approach.1 While only forty percent of
students are accepted to universities or tech-
nical schools, the OECD cites departments such
as the Fisheries and Aquaculture Department in
Epirus, which are at fifteen to twenty percent of
capacity according to the numerus clausus sys-
tem (OECD, 2011).
Free Education
Psacharopoulos (2003) identifies Article 16
of the Constitution, which guarantees free edu-
cation at all levels, as the reason for the high
admissions standards. He argues that this law
restricts access to education and subjects the
quantity and quality of education offered to
the limitations of short-term budgets. For exam-
ple, the number of students admitted to all uni-
versities and technical educational institutes
dropped from 84,690 in 2010 to 74,440 in 2011
(Athens News, 2011). This drop is more likely
associated with fiscal austerity than with a drop
in demand. Psacharopoulos lists other effects of
Article 16: quality degradation, graduate unem-
ployment, student exodus abroad, foreign
exchange loss, misallocation of resources, and
reduced human capital investment. In addition,
Jacobs and Van Der Ploeg argue that higher edu-
cation subsidies are always regressive (2006,
p. 569). That is, the poor pay for the education
of the rich. Tsakloglou and Cholezas (2005) find
that wealthier students are more likely to seek
supplementary private education and that this
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1Procrustes was a robber of Greek legend who either
stretched or cut off the legs of his victims to fit his iron bed.
“Procrustean” refers to the use of arbitrary standards in
needs assessment.
extra education is effective in gaining admission
to universities, even when controlling for wealth
and parental education. So the effect of this
“free” education is in fact an increase in inequal-
ity. According to Psacharopoulos and Papakon-
stantinou (2005), only the highly educated
understand the argument that “free” higher
education can increase inequality. Educated
Greeks support this arrangement because they
enjoy privileges such as less competition for civil
service positions.
Greeks in general fear reform (Mitsopou-
los and Pelagidis, 2011, p. 13). Because of the
high incidence of tax evasion and the vast
informal economy, Greeks fear the short-
term losses of regulation without fully realiz-
ing the benefits of reform. This argument
applies to higher education where the loss of
free tuition is an immediate cost of reform
while introducing fees has more uncertain ben-
efits. However, this paper argues in a later sec-
tion that the recent reforms (though they
introduce tuition fees for only a small pro-
portion of students) will eventually gain sup-
port as the benefits are realized.
Autonomy
The lack of autonomy in the Greek higher
education system is well documented. Mitsopou-
los and Pelagidis (2008) compare the administra-
tive and financial autonomy of higher educa-
tion in seven EU countries. The authors develop
an index to measure autonomy with a minimum
of zero and a maximum of seven by using seven
categories. Greece has the lowest index at .5, sig-
nificantly lower than even Italy and Spain, whose
higher education problems were covered in
previous volumes of this journal (Lynch, 2005
and Rheinauer, 2003). Financial and administra-
tive decisions are almost entirely centralized. The
ministry decides academic staff openings, though
universities do make hiring decisions through
a complicated set of procedures. Budgets are not
given by lump sum; instead, the Ministry decides
how to allocate the budget incrementally for each
university. 
Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis find a high cor-
relation between this autonomy index and the
rate of highly cited faculty publications. Simi-
larly, Martins et al. (2007, p. 66) formulate meas-
ures of input and output flexibilities for a larger
set of 29 wealthy countries. Input flexibility
includes student selection, budget autonomy,
and staff policy. Output flexibility includes
course content, the availability of short studies,
student choice, regional mobility, and the
existence of numerus clausus. Greece ranks last
in the input flexibility index and second to last
in the output flexibility index.
Accountability
With autonomy, universities need per-
formance incentives and accountability stan-
dards for funding. By several measures, Greece’s
university system lacks accountability. Mar-
tins et al. (2007, p. 66) created a measure of
accountability for university systems, basing
their accountability measurements on exter-
nal evaluation, transparency, and the determi-
nants of public and private funding. Of the 38
European and North American university sys-
tems they studied, Greece scored ahead of only
Turkey. Greece did, however, enact laws in 2005
and 2007 to address the lack of accountability.
In 2005 Greece founded the Hellenic Quality
Assurance Agency (HQAA), which publishes data
on universities and ensures that institutions
meet quality assurance standards. The 2007 law
requires universities to develop four-year fund-
ing plans that include private funding. Univer-
sities must meet HQAA standards to receive
funding according to their plans. However,
the OECD noted that, as of 2011 this law has not
yet been fully implemented.
Competition
The Ministry of Education traditionally
imposes a system of top-down accountability
for universities. The Greek people would insti-
tute bottom-up accountability if they had the
power to choose between education suppli-
ers. The Greek Constitution prevents this form
of accountability by banning private univer-
sities. Therefore, we can understand Greek
education as a regulated monopoly. One symp-
tom of this monopoly is the restriction on qual-
ity education. The university system has very
low admission rates, and Greece therefore
sends more students abroad per capita than any
other country worldwide (Psacharopoulos,
2003; OECD, 2011). Additionally, while overall
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unemployment in Greece is quite high at
23.1 percent, youth unemployment is an aston-
ishing 54.9 percent as of May 2012 (Hannon
and Bouras). Though this situation is partly
due to the state of the economy and the Greek
laws that reduce labor mobility, youth unem-
ployment has traditionally been relatively high
in Greece.
New Reforms
Though insufficient funding is a long-
standing problem for Greek universities, the
larger problem is inefficiency. The reform bill
passed by the Hellenic Parliament in August
2011 includes measures to improve efficiency.
While time will judge the effectiveness of the
reforms, this bill is the most far-reaching higher
education reform in Greece since the higher
education law of 1982. The most important
measures of this bill are intended to:
1. Reduce the number of “eternal stu-
dents” by charging tuition three years
after a student matriculates. In addi-
tion, tuition will be charged in more
graduate programs.
2. Curb student protests; the asylum law
will be replaced with a looser “aca-
demic freedom” clause, which allows
limited police presence on university
campuses.
3. Prevent overlap of courses; some power
to design curricula will be transferred
from departments to colleges.
4. Base faculty pay on productivity as
determined by teaching loads and
research output, instead of by national
pay scales.
5. Base university funding to a larger
extent on output. For example, the
Hellenic Quality Assurance Agency,
established in 2007, will tie univer-
sity funding to graduates’ success on
the job market.
6. Require that the fifteen-member uni-
versity boards include six external
members.
7. Tighten the role students play in fac-
ulty decisions and university admin-
istration elections.
8. Attempt to bring in more private funding.
Reactions to the Reform
The reactions to the reforms in 2011
were fierce and polarized, resulting in street
protests on one side and exuberant praise on the
other. Students and faculty protested immedi-
ately. Academics from 43 countries petitioned
against the bill. The larger issue, however, is that
university administrations have failed to imple-
ment the law. Every single part of the reform
has been hotly contested. The principal sticking
point for students is their loss of power; for
the administration, it is the inclusion of exter-
nal members on boards. University rectors have
appealed to the Constitutional Court, arguing
that the inclusion of external members is
unconstitutional. For now, only the University
of Crete has chosen to comply with the reforms.
Though the universities in Athens are generally
regarded within Greece as the flagships of the
university system, the University of Crete is
the only Greek institution ranked in the top 400
of the Times Higher Education rankings. It is
possible that openness to reform is one reason
that the University of Crete is ranked the best in
Greece.
One of the most surprising aspects about
the new bill is not its content, but that it passed
so overwhelmingly, with 90 percent of Members
of Parliament voting in favor. Considering the
strong disagreements between the socialist
and conservative parties, this large majority is
unprecedented and required only small compro-
mises. Higher education in Greece is static and
the issues rarely change. The following sentence
from an article published in 1981 would apply
today simply by replacing “1976” with “2011”: 
It is now time to come back to the basic
contradiction that marks the recent his-
tory of Greek education. It can be summa-
rized in a few words: while the develop-
mental imperatives of Greek society clearly
required educational reform, while exten-
sive reform of the educational system
was proposed by international organiza-
tions and foreign advisers, while it was for-
mally supported by both government and
opposition political parties, such reform
did not materialize until 1976 (Fran-
goudakis, p. 13). 
The leading conservative newspaper in Greece,
Kathimerini, applauded the strong consensus
79
in several editorials and described the law as
forward-looking and courageous (Athanasiou,
2011; Lakasas, 2011; Tsoukalis, 2011). Further-
more, the reform is supported by influential
international organizations, including the
OECD and the EU; in fact, the OECD pro-
posed many of the reforms included in the new
law (OECD, 2011).
Since the initial political consensus, how-
ever, the elections and political disruptions of
2012 have stalled implementation of the
reforms. From March 2012 to July 2012, there
have been four different education ministers.
Anna Diamantopoulou was education minister
from October 2009 to March 2012 and played an
instrumental role in passing the reforms. Geor-
gios Babiniotis replaced her in the coalition gov-
ernment of Lucas Papademos. He cleared fund-
ing for universities that had not implemented
the new law (Mavrogordatos, 2012). Angeliki-
Efrosini Kiaou replaced him in the interim gov-
ernment and then Konstantinos Arvanitopou-
los replaced her in the Samaras coalition
government. Arvanitopoulos has supported pro-
posed amendments that will repeal parts of
the reform bill (Marseilles, 2012).
Unlike the other parts of the reform,
implementation of the repeal of the asylum
law should not be held up by extraneous obsta-
cles. However, George Mavrogordatos, a profes-
sor at the University of Athens, reports that
police still refrain from entering university cam-
puses. The fact that such a straightforward
change has not prevailed does not bode well
for other reforms.
Prospects for the Success of this
Reform
The educational reform law can be
assessed in several ways. At the lowest level, it
will succeed if it is implemented and accepted,
which is not guaranteed. Then, most impor-
tantly, the reform will succeed if:
• It contributes to the improvement of
the Greek economy
• The school year ceases to be cut short
by protests and strikes
• The universities produce more research
and offer higher-quality education
While this new law is part of continuing
reform in Greece, it was spurred by the finan-
cial crisis and external pressure from the Troika
for reform. However, unlike other economic
reforms, passage of this bill was not split along
party lines. It was also designed, through input
from a constitutional-court judge, to avoid legit-
imate challenges to its constitutionality (Abbott,
2012). Therefore, as with previous education
reforms, the chances are high that it will ulti-
mately be implemented.
The larger question of ultimate success
will depend on the future state of the Greek
economy and several other factors. Protests
are likely to continue because they have become
such an established part of modern Greek cul-
ture, since the overthrow of the junta, that
any government intervention in higher educa-
tion is likely to provoke demonstrations
(Tsakonas 2007, p. 5).
Economists have long known and agreed
on the principles of good education reform
(Jacobs and Van Der Ploeg, p. 536) and gener-
ally concur on which policies will improve life
for Greek citizens. The problem is that reforms
are traditionally more beneficial to some groups
of people than to others, and it is difficult to pre-
dict which groups will benefit and which will
not. Furthermore, the success of reforms is not
only a matter of economics but also of politi-
cal economy. The Greek public is uncertain
about the future and typically open to populist
arguments, but after good policies are imple-
mented, they will naturally be accepted and sup-
ported (Rodrik, p. 571). The time delay between
passage of reform legislation and successful
implementation is often what impedes good eco-
nomic policy. If the educational reforms ulti-
mately prove successful, however, future reform
efforts may have an easier path. Education
reform in Greece may eventually contribute to
the evolution of a new equilibrium in Greek
society with a stronger potential for political
consensus (Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis).
Suggestions for Further Reform
Though the current system of free edu-
cation is inefficient, tuition is unconstitu-
tional in Greece. If free tuition continues, the
funding structure must be changed in ways that
are both constitutional and more efficient. An
alternative to the current numerus clausus sys-
tem would be to issue vouchers to students that
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would entitle them to enroll at any university
that accepts them. Universities would then
receive funding based on the number of stu-
dents who choose to enroll. Under this sys-
tem, university funding would be competitive
and less political. Most importantly, this system
would give students legitimate power within the
system. Universities would be judged based on
the value of the education they offer students as
reflected in students’ choices. Furthermore, stu-
dents would have less reason to protest their loss
of power in administrative decisions because
they would have ultimate control, based on their
own enrollment choices (Jacobs and Van der
Ploeg, p. 571).
The current reforms take a small step
toward making the funding of universities more
efficient by tying funding to student success and
faculty research output. The problem is that this
system is not strategy-proof, i.e. universities
have the incentive to “game” the system with-
out making real improvements. For example,
simplistic measures of research output can
lower output quality. American economist
Richard Thaler said of one unsuccessful job can-
didate, “What his resume lacked was five bad
papers” (Frank, 2012). Thaler implies here
that the candidate could have increased his
“research output” by adding several poor papers.
This is the fundamental issue described in
Hayek’s “The Use of Knowledge in Society.”
Applied to the higher education system in
Greece, Hayek’s argument suggests that, since
one person can attain only a limited understand-
ing of the information available on Greek uni-
versities, the hundreds of thousands of Greek
students can evaluate each university more
effectively than can the limited staff of the
Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Educa-
tion is bound to a limited perspective in eval-
uating universities and cannot avoid the influ-
ence of political pressure.
Another step the system can take is to
replace the entrance examinations with an apti-
tude test such as the Scholastic Aptitude Test
(SAT). The aptitude test would allow for con-
sistent measurement of students across schools
so that students’ grades, which already factor
into admissions, would measure how much a
student has learned. Such a test would reduce
the need for cram schools. Then families would
not need to spend twice as much on cram
schools as the government does on public sec-
ondary education. Georgios Babiniotis, the Edu-
cation Minister sworn in on March 6, 2012, said
that the Ministry’s priorities must be “to over-
haul senior high school and university entrance
exams” (Kathimerini, 2012).
Finally, the least likely, but the most effec-
tive, reform would be to break up the higher
education monopoly by charging tuition and
allowing private universities. The government
could offer student loans with repayment rates
tied to income after graduation or offer finan-
cial aid to students in need. Such a major Con-
stitutional amendment would be unprecedented
in Greece but would emphasize the importance
of reform.
Greece will have a difficult recovery from
the economic crisis. Nevertheless, the Greek
Parliament has seized the opportunity presented
by the crisis to enact serious education reform.
Though the reform bill passed with a strong
consensus, implementation has been held up by
budget crises, protests, and the turmoil of Greek
politics. Each new education minister has
chipped away at and delayed implementation.
These recent developments certainly do not
bode well for the ultimate success of the
reforms. Nevertheless, I have argued that, while
they do not go far enough, these reforms are an
unprecedented step and can provide a meas-
ure of improvement for the students and econ-
omy of Greece. 
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